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EDWARD S. ROBINSON
WE RECORD with sorrow the death of Professor Edward S. Robinson,
victim of a tragic accident at the age of forty-four. As a psychologist he made
a stimulating and productive contribution to the intellectual life of the Yale
Law School; as a friendly and sociable member of its faculty he was known,
respected and liked by the entire student body. His criticism of ways of
thinking about law was incisive and fruitful of good controversy. He gave
much that cannot be replaced.
DIVISION OF JOINT RATES AND THE
BALTIMORE & OHIO CASE
WH E TWO or more connecting carriers publish a single charge for the
carriage of passengers or freight from an originating point on one line to a
destination on another, a joint fare or rate is said to have been established
for the through service in question.' The joint rate may be put into effect
by voluntary arrangement of the carriers or it may be prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.2 The division or proportion which each
1. See McCousmrSTE AND CLARE, FEDERAL MOTo CARRIER REGULATION (1935) 161.
2. The power to establish joint rates was first conferred upon the Commission by § 4
of the Hepburn Act. 34 STAT. 590 (1906). Today, under § 15(3) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, it is made the duty of the
Commission to establish through routes, joint rates, and the divisions of such rates, "when-
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line receives for its share of the joint haul is normally determined by agree-
ment among the participating carriers. 3 But under a system of private bar-
gaining, serious disputes may arise between the carriers, 4 and strategically
stronger roads are in a position to force unjust divisions upon weaker lines.5
Interstate Commerce Commission supervision of the divisions process was
instituted by the Hepburn Act of 1906.0 The subsequent history of the
Commission's control over rate divisions reveals an increase in the scope of
the Commission's power and a change in emphasis as to objectives, reflecting
a tendency to treat the problem as one affecting not only'the individual car-
riers involved but also the public in general, because of the importance of rate
apportionment to the statutory objective of maintaining an efficient national
transportation system.7
Under the authority conferred by the Hepburn Act of 1906, occasions for
the exercise of the Commissioh's power were limited. It was not authorized
to prescribe divisions on its own initiative; instead it could act only upon
complaint of the interested carriers in the event of their antecedent failure to
agree.8 Furthermore, as late as 1916, the statute was interpreted as re-
stricting the Commission's power of intervention, even upon complaint of
ever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest." The Commission is
empowered to act on its own initiative as well as upon complaint, and to establish minimum
as well as maximum charges. 41 STAT. 485 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(3) (1934).
3. See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 814 (1936) ; Peoria
& P. U. Ry., 93 I. C. C. 3, 19 (1924).
4. ". . . Congress was aware of the fact that occasional irreconcilable disagree-
ments arise over divisions. . . . In our observation and experience such disagreements
are of relatively infrequent occurrence; but when they do arise the power should be lodged
somewhere to settle the controversy ... " Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 49
I. C. C. 540, 544 (1918).
5. Larger lines were obviously in a position to negotiate a fair agreement. Shorter
lines with more than one trunk line connection were also able to protect themselves by
playing one connecting line against another. But a short line with only one outlet was
often at the mercy of its powerful neighbor. See Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 49
I. C. C. 540, 543, 544 (1918). An officer of a trunk line, discussing the way in which prior
divisions of certain rates were arrived at with a short line connection, stated before the
Commission: "I think we rather told them [the short line], 'Here it is. We can't give you
any more.' They were forced to take it. We are forced to take divisions right along we
don't like. The Burlington and Union Pacific and other lines that have the whip hand wield
it. We are a trunk line, and almost as big, but they say, 'If you don't want it, you stay
out of the business.' The big lines fight like cats and dogs over divisions. The question of
divisions is one where diamond cuts diamond, or, putting it the other way, a lump of coal
cuts a lump of coal." Wichita N. Ry. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 811. C. C. 513, 514
(1923).
6. 34 STAT. 589, 590 (1906).
7. For a general discussion, see 1 SHARFMAN, THE NTERsTATE CommracE Con-
mIssiON (1931) 216-219; id., vol. 3-B, at 255 et seq.
8. Louisville Board of Trade v. I., C. & S. T. Co., 27 I. C. C. 499 (1913); see
Wichita Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 25 I. C. C. 625, 631 (1913). The
Commission could not review divisions upon the complaint of a shipper. Reno Grocery
Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 23 1. C. C. 400 (1912).
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the carriers, to cases where the joint rate in question had originally been
established by its order, thus excluding situations where the carriers com-
plained of divisions received under a voluntarily established joint rate.9 Even
during this period, however, these restrictions upon the Commission's juris-
diction were considered inoperative if rate divisions were utilized to effect
discriminations forbidden by the Act;1° and the Commission intervened re-
peatedly in the absence of complaint and regardless of whether it had pre-
scribed the joint rate to compel the removal of such discriminatory practices
as the concession of a preferential division to one of similarly situated roads n
or the granting of excessive divisions to an industrial line controlled by a
shipping concern, amounting to a rebate to the shipper.'- Similarly, the
Commission was active in eradicating the specialized phase of the latter situ-
ation where a carrier purchased fuel at a point on a connecting line and
sought either to obtain a fraudulent division of the joint rate under which the
fuel traveled by billing the shipments to a point on its own line beyond the
actual destination,' 3 or to gain an excessive division simply by forcing the
connecting line to accept an unduly small proportion of the joint rate in
return for the business.14
9. Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 40 I. C. C. 509 (1916). Carriers sometimes
employed an indirect device to evade this interpretation of the Act. A tariff canceling
the voluntary joint rate and proposing a higher rate was filed by the carrier with the
expectation, sometimes frankly stated, that the Commission would suspend it. Upon
hearing, no attempt was made to justify the proposed increased charges. The Commis-
sion would therefore condemn them and enter an order requiring the existing joint rate
to be maintained. Since this order established the joint rate for the future, it was con-
sidered a sufficient basis for the Commission to exercise jurisdiction over the division
upon complaint by a dissatisfied carrier. Coal from Toluca, Ill., 37 L C. C. 230 (1915) ;
Lake and Rail Rate Cancellations, 38 I. C. C. 201 (1916) ; cf. Morgantown & Kingvood
Divisions, 49 I. C. C. 540, 542-543 (1918). Even this possibility was removed in 1917
when a temporary amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act was enacted, providing
that no increased rate could be filed without the Commission's approval. 40 STrA. 272
(1917).
10. In re Divisions of Joint Rates on Coal, 22 I. C. C. 51 (1911) ; Rates on Railroad
Fuel and other Coal, 36 I. C. C. 1 (1915) ; see Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 40
I. C.C. 509, 511 (1916); Commercial Club of Duluth v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 27
I. C. C. 639, 656 (1913); Manufacturer's Ry. v. St. L, L M. & S. Ry., 32 I. C. C. 100,
104 (1914). The Supreme Court approved this interpretation of the Commission's au-
thority in Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1914).
11. In re Wharfage Charges of the Galveston Wharf Co., 23 I. C. C. 535 (1912);
cf. Western P. R. R. v. Southern P. Co., 55 I. C. C. 71 (1919).
12. In re Divisions of Joint Rates, 10 I. C. C. 385 (1904) ; In re Divisions of Joint
Rates on Coal, 22 I. C. C. 51 (1911) ; Tap Line Case, 23 I. C. C. 277 (1912), reu'd on
other grounds, 234 U. S. 1 (1914) ; Colonial Salt Co. v. Michigan, I. & I. Line, 23
I. C. C. 358 (1912) ; Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212 (1914) ; In re Marion &
R. V. Ry., 42 I. C. C. 607 (1916); Wasteful Services by Tap Lines, 53 1. C. C. 656
(1919); see Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 299.
13. Beekman Lumber Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. L, 21 1. C. C. 270 (1911).
14. Rates on Railroad Fuel and Other Coal, 36 I. C. C. 1 (1915). In order to
eliminate this type of discrimination, the Commission required carriers to file their
1937]
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During this period, the Commission's conception of what factors it should
consider in apportioning rates was also rather narrow. While the Act au-
thorized the establishment of divisions which were "just and reasonable,"
this was thought to require merely that those factors should be emphasized
which would lead to a fair division so far as the disputing carriers were
concerned, and not to necessitate consideration of any special public interest
in the apportionment of rates.1 Probably the most common technique for
dividing joint rates was the mileage basis, a method whereby each carrier
was awarded a share of the joint rate proportionate to the length of haul it
contributed to the total distance of shipment.' The Commission refused,
however, to accept mileage as an exclusive standard of fairness,' 7 and acknowl-
edged shortness of haul,' 8 terminal services, 19 and empty car movements 20 as
burdensome operating conditions entitling the carrier so handicapped to a
more generous share of the joint rate. It even held that strategic bargaining
advantages possessed by a carrier should be reflected in the division awarded
to that carrier.2 1 On the other hand, the Commission refused to recognize
as an element relevant to the determination of fair divisions the prior measure
of the divisions under consideration.22 But while the Commission attempted
in this way to do justice as between the parties, the statutory view that this
was its only function led it to overlook or disregard such factors as the
financial needs 23 and operating efficiency of the carriers and the public im-
divisions of joint rates applicable on railway fuel coal, and when changes were made,
to file statements in justification of such changes. In re Filing with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission Divisions of Joint Rates on Railway Fuel Coal, 37 I. C. C. 265 (1915).
15. "This Commission has uniformly held that the division of a through rate was
not a matter of concern to the public . . ." Board of Trade of Chicago v. Atlantic
City R. R., 20 I. C. C. 504, 508 (1911).
16. See Louisville Board of Trade v. Indianapolis, C. & S. Traction Co., 34 I. C. C.
640, 642 (1915); Low Moor Iron Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 42 I. C. C. 221, 227
(1916); cf. Birmingham Packing Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 500 (1907).
17. See Star Grain and Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 14 I. C. C. 364,
370 (1908) ; In re alleged Unreasonable Rates on Meats, 23 I. C. C. 656, 661-662 (1912).
18. Louisville Board of Trade v. Indianapolis C. & S. Traction Co., 34 I. C. C. 640
(1915).
19. Louisville Board of Trade v. Indianapolis C. & S. Traction Co., 34 I. C. C. 640
(1915) ; see Low Moor Iron Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 42 1. C. C. 221, 227 (1916).
20. Kosmos Portland Cement Co. v. Illinois C. R. R., 42 I. C. C. 377 (1916) ; Cape
Girardeau Portland Cement Co. v. St. Louis, & S. F. R. R., 47 I. C. C. 204 (1917) ; see
Low Moor Iron Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 42 I. C. C. 221, 227 (1916).
21. Star Grain & Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 14 I. C. C. 364 (1908);
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 35 I. C. C. 460 (1915). But
strategic advantages did not excuse discrimination. Western P. R. R. v. Southern P. Co.,
55 I. C. C. 71 (1919).
22. Low Moor Iron Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 42 I. C. C. 221 (1916).
23. Financial needs were held not an operative consideratioi in divisions eases.
McGowan-Foshee Lumber Co. v. Florida, A. & G. R. R., 51 I. C. C. 317 (1918);
Laona & N. R. R. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. Ry., 52 I. C. C. 7 (1919).
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portance of the transportation services rendered by them--factors which
were later deemed by Congress and the Commission to be of primary im-
portance to the proper apportionment of rates.
The first step towards broadening the Commission's power over rate ap-
portionment was taken by the Commission itself in 1918 when it reversed its
prior decision and held that it could adjust divisions upon complaint even
though it had not originally prescribed the joint rate.2 , A far more important
enlargement of the Commission's authority over divisions took place with the
passage of the Transportation Act of 1920.20 The provisions for rate ap-
portionment embodied in that Act were designed not only to assure "just,
reasonable and equitable divisions . . . as between the carriers," - but
also to effect constructive ends by providing a supplementary means for the
distribution of carrier earnings to weaker roads considered essential to the
transportation system. 28 Under the Act, the Commission was empowered
to prescribe divisions29 upon its own initiative as well as upon complaint,30
24. See 3-B SHARF AN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COaMzss1o. (1936) 257, I1 511.
25. Morgantown and Kingwood Divisions, 49 I. C. C. 540 (1918).
26. 41 STAT. 456 (1920).
27. The duty was imposed upon the carriers of establishing just and reasonable
divisions as between themselves. 41 STAT. 475 (1920), 49 U.S. C. § 1(4) (1934).
28. See New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 191 (1923); Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 477-478 (1924).
29. Under § 15(6) of the Act, the Commission was also authorized to require, as
reparation, retroactive adjustment of divisions which were found to be unfair, but only
where the joint rates were established "pursuant to a finding or order of the Com-
mission," and only for the period following the filing of the complaint. The Commission
held that the former requirement was not satisfied where the joint rates were "established"
as a result of a suspension order of the Commission prohibiting proposed increased rates
from going into effect and requiring the maintenance of present rates. Petroleum Oil
from Ark. to -La., 95 I. C. C. 55 (1924). Compare note 9, sitpra. But the Commission
held it had power to require retroactive adjustments of divisions where the joint rates
had been established by the carriers as the result of a "cease or desist" order barring
higher rates [Diamond Alkali Co. v. Fairport, P. & E. R. R., 62 I.C.C. 161 (1921)], or
where the joint rates in question had merely been effected by general increases or de-
creases in rates ordered by the Commission [Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. Pittsburgh &
L. E. R. R., 61 I. C. C. 272 (1921) ; Divisions received by Brimstone R. R. & Canal Co.,
88 I C. C. 62 (1924), 104 I. C. C. 415 (1925) : New York Dock Ry. v. Baltimore & 0.
R. R., 89 I. C. C. 695 (1924); -Marion & E. R. R. v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 96 L C. C.
402 (1925)]. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Brimstonc case, supra, spe-
cifically disapproving the above cases and holding that the Commission was authorized
to adjust divisions retroactively only when the joint rate was established by the Com-
mission after a full hearing in respect to the specific rate. Brimstone P, R. Y. United
States, 276 U. S. 104 (1928).
Although the Commission is authorized to adjust divisions retroactively only for the
period following the filing of the complaint, a court will order adjustment of divisions
over the period between the Commission's establishment of the rate and filing of the
complaint. Atlantic C L. R. R. v. Baltimore & 0. RL R., 12 F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1935).
30. 41 STAT. 486 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(6) (1934). The Commission held that
it was authorized to prescribe divisions "on complaint" under this Section, where a
19371
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thus extending its control to situations where weak roads might be compelled
to accept unjust and unreasonable divisions without complaint through fear
of antagonizing powerful outlet lines.31 This provision for intervention in
the absence of disagreement among the carriers was in itself recognition of
a public interest in the division of rates superior to private contractual rights.32
But even more important were the factors which the Commission was di-
rected by the Act to consider in prescribing divisions. Section 15(6) stipu-
lates that in determining the divisions of joint rates, fares, and charges, "the
Commission shall give due consideration, among other things, to the efficiency
with which the carriers concerned are operated, the amount of revenue re-
quired to pay their respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return
on their railway property held for and used in the service of transportation,
and the importance to the public of the transportation services of such
carriers and also whether any particular participating carrier is an originat-
ing, intermediate, or delivering line, and any other fact or circumstance
which would ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul, entitle one
carrier to a greater or less proportibn than another carrier of the joint
rate, fare or charge." 3 3 It is the enumeration of these guiding principles,
rarely, if ever, operative in the establishment of divisions by private agree-
ment,34 that most clearly reflects the shift of emphasis to furtherance of
the public interest through the apportionment of rates.
The Commission was quick to appreciate the significant enhancement of
its power. In one of the first divisions cases decided after the passage of
the 1920 legislation, the Commission, in rejecting the defendant's claim
that certain strategic advantages justified the status quo, declared uncom-
promisingly that divisions were affected with a public interest3 5 And in
the New England Divisions case of 1922,36 the Commission gave weight
to a factor to which its attention was first directed by the new legislation
and unequivocally utilized its power to adjust divisions in the light of
the varying financial needs of the carriers concerned. In a preliminary
proceeding, the Commission, while admitting that the evidence supported
the claims of the New England roads as to special operating handicaps
and serious financial difficulties, had declined to assert the unprecedented
exercise of power involved in granting them blanket increases of freight
carrier's complaint asked for the establishment of joint rates without mention of the
divisions question, but where that issue was later injected into the hearing. Lodwick-
White Coal Co. v. Director General, 58 I.C.C. 530 (1920). But cf. Morgantown &
IV. Ry. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 63 I. C. C. 197 (1921); Standard Oil Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 113 1. C. C. 597 (1926).
31. See H. R. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919) 9-10; CoFERFNCE REP.
No. 650, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
32. 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 218.
33. 41 STAT. 486 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(6) (1934).
34. See United States War Dep't v. Abilene & S. Ry., 155 I. C. C. 343, 347 (1929).
35. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., 61 1. C. C. 272 (1921).
36. 66 I. C.C. 196 (1922).
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divisions with all connecting lines, without investigation as to the fairness
of each division. Within a year, however, the Commission instituted a
further proceeding, and adopting the approach requested by the New Eng-
land lines, ultimately awarded them a 15% increase in their division of the
joint rates under consideration. The grounds advanced for the decision
were that the fundamental purpose of Congress under the Transportation
Act had been to assure an effective transportation system for the nation,
that the public interest required the carriers, as essential 1 and mutually
dependent parts of the transportation system, to be maintained in effective
working condition, and that the relative amount and cost of service rendered,
including "a due proportion of the burden of maintaining the financial in-
tegrity and credit of the carrier," was a prime factor in determining fair
divisions.3 8 A horizontal increase was held justified in view of the fact
that comprehensive revision of the individual rate divisions could be ac-
complished only after months of labor and would amount to denying the
New England roads, during that period, the relief to which they were held
entitled.
Upon appeal, this decision was affirmed in full by the Supreme Court,30
and thereafter, a number of rate division cases have followed the same pat-
tern, recognizing the pertinence of relative financial needs to a determina-
tion of the propriety of a rate division. 40
37. Where the services of the carrier were not essential the Commission has de-
clined to act. Krein v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 87 I. C. C. 118 (1923) ; Christie & Eastern
Ry. v. Kansas, C. S. Ry., 93 I. C. C. 675 (1924) ; Mfurray, Receiver v. Erie R. R., 95
I.C.C. 13 (1924).
38. New England Divisions, 66 I. C.C. 196, 199 (1922).
39. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923).
40. Relative financial requirements have influenced the Commission's decisions to
an important extent. Jackson v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry.. 66 I. C, C. 359 (1922); In re
Divisions of Joint Rates and Fares of M. & N. A. RL R. 68 I. C. C. 47 (1922), 98
I. C. C. 119 (1925); Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Divisions, 73 L C. C. 319 (1922),
96 I. C. C. 378 (1925), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Abilene & S. Ry.,
265 U. S. 274 (1924); .Marion & E. R. R. v. Chicago & E. 1. Ry., 96 1. Q C. 4013
(1925); Minnesota IV. R. R. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 109 1. C. C. 127 (1926);
Ulster & D. R. R. v. New York C. R. R., 140 1. C. C. 204 (1928); Atlantic C. L
R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R.. 194 I. C. C. 729 (1933), 198 1. C. C. 375 (1934), aff'd,
56 Sup. Ct. 797 (1936). But the Commission has stated repeatedly that financial need
is only one of the elements to be considered. Federal Valley R. R v. Toledo & 0. C.
Ry.. 6S I. C. C. 499 (1922); Murray, Receiver, v. Erie R. KL, 95 I. C. C. 13 (1924);
Salina N. R. R. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rv., 92 1. C. C. 475 (1924); Massachusetts
Oil Refining Co. v. Boston & A. R. R., 93 1. C. C. 110 (1924); Minneapolis, A. &
C. R. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 148 I C. C. 37 (1928); Wheelock & Bierd v.
Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 169 I. C. C. 594 (1930). And where the government was oper-
ating a barge line to test its possibilities as a transportation agency, its financial needs
were held entirely irrelevant because giving weight to this factor might cloud the
results of the experiment. United States War Dep't v. Abilene & S. Ry., 92 L C. C.
528 (1924).
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Even under the 1920 Act, however, it still remains of primary importance
to establish reasonable divisions between the carriers on the basis of the
amount and cost of the service performed by each. 4' Carriers and Com-
mission concede that accurate ascertainment of the cost of any particular
freight or passenger service as dissociated from the cost of a myriad of sim-
ilar services is impossible, except in the extraordinary case. 42 In attempting
to surmount this difficulty, consideration is sometimes given to cost studies
of various types usually based on system average figures in one form or
another. 43 A typical example of such a cost study appears in a recent divi-
sions case in which certain carriers attempted to show the cost of transporting
citrus fruit. Total operating expenses including taxes were allocated between
freight and passenger service under a formula prescribed by the Commission.
Deductions were made from total freight expenses for car repairs, depre-
ciation, and retirements, to allow for the fact that citrus fruit was moved in
rented refrigerator cars. These net freight expenses were then divided by
total freight car miles, and to the quotient was added the cost per mile of
renting refrigerator cars. It was urged by the carrier that the figure com-
puted represented the cost per car mile of transporting this type of freight.
44
But cost studies of this character obviously involve the use of so many
more or less arbitrary formulas as to be finally unpersuasive. 4 5 Their utility
as pertinent comparisons varies directly as the cost of the particular service
approximates average system costs, 46 a ratio which itself can be determined
The Ne,, England decision has also provided precedent for cases involving divisions
between groups of carriers as distinguished from individual carriers. Divisions of Freight
Rates, 148 I. C. C. 457 .(1928), 156 I. C. C. 94 (1929), aff'd, Beaumont, S. L. & W.
Ry. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 74 (1930) ; Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 I. C. C. 299 (1934) ;
Short Lines' Divisions, 205 I. C. C. 61 (1934); Southwestern-Official Divisions, 216
I. C. C. 687 (March 9, 1936). There are pending two other related controversies con-
cerning the division of rates of official territory carriers with western carriers and
southern carriers (Docket No. 24160).
41. See New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196, 198 (1922).
42. See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 811-812 (1936);
New York Dock Ry. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 89 I. C. C. 695, 699 (1924); United
States War Dep't v. Abilene & S. Ry., 92 I. C. C. 528, 538 (1924); Divisions of
Freight Rates, 156 I. C. C. 94, 103 (1929).
43. See Ulster & D. R. R. v. New York C. R. R.. 140 I. C. C. 204, 210-211 (1928);
Strouds Creek & M. R. R. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 159 I. C. C. 601, 605 (1929);
Southwestern Official Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687, 697-699 (March 9, 1936) ; cf. Advances
on Coal within Chicago Switching District, 53 I. C. C. 442, 444-445 (1919) , Divisions
received by Brimstone R. R. & Canal Co., 88 I. C. C. 62, 63-67 (1924), 104 I. C. C.
415, 416 et seq. (1925): Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I. C. C. 457, 474-475 (1928).
44. See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 810 (1936). This
study, presented by carriers petitioning for an increase of previously determined divisions,
was rejected after consideration by the Commission. Rehearing was denied, Id. at 816.
45. See Ulster & D. R. R. v. New York C. R. R., 140 1. C. C. 204, 211 (1928);
cf. R. W. Burch v. Railway Express Agency, 190 I. C. C. 520, 534-535 (1932).
46. See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 812-813 (1936)
Nevada-California-Oregon Divisions, 73 I. C. C. 330, 335 (1922) ; Salina N. R. R.
818 (Vol. 46: 811
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only by guesswork. In view of the general unreliability of comparisons of
this character, the Commission does not depend upon them alone, but gives
weight to numerous individual factors bearing upon the relative cost of
service to the carriers. Thus, the fact- that a carrier is an originating47 or
delivering road,48 or a narrow gauge carrier,40 or that fuel supplies are
located off the carrier's line,50 unfavorable climatic conditions,", specialized
services,5 2 shortness of haul,53 light loads, 4 unfavorable physical terrain,55
a higher rate level,50 empty car movements,5 T7 branch line movements, low
density of traffic,5 9 and car rental chargesGO are all factors normally indicat-
ing difficult operating conditions and high service costs. On the other hand,
population increases, 1 expanded agricultural, mineral or industrial produc-
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 92 I. C. C. 475, 480 (1924); Division of Joint Rates and
Fares of M. & N. A. Ry, 98 I. C. C. 119, 135 (1925).
47. Wichita N. Ry. v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry., 81 . C. C. 513 (1923); MIarion
& E. R. R. v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 96 I. C. C. 402 (1925); Western Md. Ry. v. Md.
& P. R. R., 167 I. C. C. 57 (1930) ; cf. Strouds Creek & 36. R. R. v. Baltimore & 0.
R. P., 159 I. C. C. 601 (1929).
48. Erie R. R. v. Alabama & V. Ry., 98 I. C. C. 268 (1925); Hoboken Manu-
facturers' R. R. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 132 I. C.C. 579 (1927).
49. Nevada-California-Oregon Divisions, 73 I. C. C. 330 (1922).
50. New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196 (1922); Carriers' Divisions of Bitumin-
ous Coal Rates, 85 I. C. C. 617 (1924).
51. Freeman & Boettcher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 73 L C. C. 178 (1922);
Manistee & N. Ry. v. Ann. A. R. P., 160 I. C. C. 187 (1929).
52. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 I. C. C. 729 (1933).
53. Divisions of Joint Rates & Fares of M. & N. A. R. PL, 68 I. C. C. 47 (1922);
Alabama & M. R. R. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 95 .C. C. 385 (1925) ; New England
Divisions, 126 I. C. C. 579 (1927).
54. New England Divisions, 66 I. C.C. 196 (1922).
55. Freeman & Boettcher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.. 73 1. C. C. 178 (1922);
Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 I. C. C. 299 (1934).
56. Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 1. C. C. -99 (1934): Southwestern Official
Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687 (March 9, 1936).
57. Freeman & Boettcher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.. 73 I. C. C. 178 (1922);
Atlantic Coastline R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 1. C. C. 729 (1933); Divisions of
Freight Rates, 203 I. C. C. 299 (1934).
58. New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196 (192): Alabama & M. Ry. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry.. 95 I. C. C. 385 (1925).
59. Divisions of Joint Rates & Fares of M. & N. :. R. ?, 68 . C. C. 47 (1922);
Ulster & D. R. R. v. New York C. R. R., 140 1. C. C. 204 (1928); Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 1. C. C. 729 (1933); Southwestern-Official
Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687 (March 9, 1936).
60. Chaffee R. . v. Western Md. Ry., 102 1. C. C. 53 (1925); Strouds Creek &
M. R. R. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 159 1. C. C. 601 (1929). Contra: New England
Divisions, 62 I. C. C. 513 (1921); Sewell Valley R. I_ v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 87
I. C. C. 21 (1924). Conversely, of course, the fact that a carrier is not being charged
for rented cars is to be considered in determining its division. Middle Creek R. P.. v.
Baltimore & 0. R. R., 168 1. C. C. 110 (1930).
61. Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 L C. C. 457 (1928), 203 I. C. C. 299 (1934);
Southwesteni-Official Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687 (March 9, 1936).
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tion -6 2 in the territory served by the road, and the fact that the carrier is
an intermediate line 63 tend to show relatively advantageous operating con-
ditions.
Once the Commission has weighed these numerous factors," various for-
mulae for dividing rates are available to produce the desired result. The
Commission recognizes that no single method of apportioning rates has yet
been devised to allocate fair divisions in every case. 65 The mileage basis,
while still theoretically the starting-point for the adjustment of rate divisions,
has been severely criticized by the Commission. Not only is it unsatisfactory
where the operating conditions of participating carriers differ materially,c6
but even where transportation conditions are similar, it is open to the criti-
cism that it results in the same ton-mile revenu for each participating
carrier regardless of length of haul, in violation of the principle that other
things being equal, ton-mile yields should decrease as distance increases.0
It therefore remains today, in the unmodified form, more a primary method
of comparison than a reliable means of dividing rates. However, modifi-
cations of the mileage basis are sometimes employed. There is the block
mileage plan, under which a convenient number of miles, for example 20,
is selected as the "block" unit, and the joint rate is divided in the propor-
tion the number of "blocks" in the line haul of one carrier bear to the
number in the haul of the others, odd mileage over and above even twenties
counting as a single "block." 68 Another method employed, usually where
short lines are involved, is mileage proration with fixed minima percentages
of the joint rates.69 Under this plan the rates are divided on the ordinary
62. See cases cited note 61, supra.
63. Through Routes and Joint Rates, 174 I. C. C. 477 (1931); Alton R. R. v.
Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 215 I. C. C. 317 (1936) ; see United States War Dep't v. Abilene
& S. Ry., 77 I. C. C. 317, 345-346 (1923).
64. In addition to financial needs and factors relating to the cost question, other
elements may affect the Commission's decision. Thus, where traffic was forced on a
carrier under an emergency routing agreement, it was held entitled to larger divisions
than usual. Western 'Md. Ry. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 69 I. C. C. 703 (1922). On the
other hand, the fact that the carrier is operated inefficiently (Christie & E. Ry. v.
Kansas C. S. Ry., 93 I. C. C. 675 (1924)], or has previously indulged in questionable
practices [Krein v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R., 87 I. C. C. 118 (1923)], may be influential
in defeating its claim.
65. See United States War Dep't v. Abilene & S. Ry., 77 I. C. C. 317, 353 (1923).
66. See Minnesota-Atlantic Transit Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 194
I.C.C. 111, 116 (1933).
67. Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 1. C. C. 457 (1928).
68. Western Md. Ry. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 169 I. C. C. 495 (1930); cf. Short
Lines' Divisions, 205 I. C. C. 61, 65 (1934) ; Southwestern-Official Divisions, 216 I. C. C.
687, 722-723 (March 9, 1936).
69. Divisions of Freight Rates, 208 I. C. C. 299 (1935); see Manistee & N. Ry. v.
Ann. A. R. R., 160 I. C. C. 187, 193 (1929); Short Lines' Divisions, 205 I. C. C. 61, 65
(1934) ; cf. Application of American Barge Line Co., 200 I. C. C. 717 (1934). Under
other formulas unrelated to mileage proration, carriers' divisions may be made subject
to maximum amounts or percentages of the joint rates. United States War Dep't v.
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mileage basis except that a minimum percentage of the joint rates is guar-
anteed to one or more of the carriers. Another device sometimes adopted is
the constructive mileage prorate under which the line haul mileage of one of
the carriers is weighted by multiplying it by an arbitrary figure such as 1Y, 2,
etc.70 In an attempt to find a more satisfactory method of dividing rates than
mileage proration or its variants, the Commission has at times turned to the
rate prorate.71 Under this method, the Commission selects a particular type
of rate, for example, first class rates, and ascertains the amount each carrier
acting independently would charge under this classification for the length of
haul it contributes to the total distance covered under the joint rate; the re-
spective first class rates are then used as proportional factors in dividing the
total joint rate. The rate prorate formula has been favored by the Commission
owing to the fact that relative transportation conditions find expression in
such a measure,72 but even this method is unsatisfactory where the rates used
as factors, although nominally of the same classification, i.e., first class rates,
cover a relatively different type of traffic in the territory of each carrier.Th
Other methods of rate apportionment recognized by the Commission74 include
simply awarding each carrier fixed percentages7" or amounts ("specifics") 1T
Abilene & S. Ry., 83 I. C. C. 742 (1923); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Cape F. Rys.,
197 I. C. C. 397 (1933).
70. Ohio Farm Bureau Federation v. Ahnapee & W. Ry., 89 I.C. C. 489 (1924);
Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 I.C. C. 299 (1934); Southwestern-Official Divisions,
216 I C. C. 687 (March 9, 1936).
71. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Northern P. Ry., 160 I. C. C. 794 (1930) ; see United
States War Dep't v. Abilene & So. Ry., 77 1. C. C. 317, 357 (1923). Modifications of
the rate prorate are sometimes employed, involving the use as proportional factors of
assumed rates for one or all carriers. Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 L C. C. 457
(1928), 156 I. C. C. 94 (1929); Application of Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 183
I. C. C. 503 (1932).
72. See Minnesota-Atlantic Transit Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P. R. R., 194
I.C.C. 111, 116 (1933).
73. See Revenues in Western District, 113 I.C.C. 3, 24 (1926); United States
War Dep't v. Abilene & S. Ry., 151 I. C. C. 91, 95 (1929) ; Through Routes & Joint
Rates, 174 I. C. C. 477, 484-485 (1931); cf. Short Lines' Divisions. 205 I. C. C. 61,
63 (1934).
74. Under another method recently adopted, distances of haul are classified; each
carrier is assigned a set of numerical factors, one for each class, varying in amount
according to the lengths of the hauls within the particular class; the joint rate is then
divided according to the ratio between the factors of each carrier. Atlantic C. L. R. R.
v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 I.C.C. 729 (1933). The Commission has rejected the
revenue prorate, a method by which newly established joint rates are divided in the
proportions of the prior divisional arrangement. Ibid. Arbitraries, or fixed amounts to
cover a particularly burdensome service, are sometimes deducted from the joint rate
before prorating it. Alcolu R. R. v. Atlantic C. L R. R., 140 I. C.C. 466 (1928);
Atlantic C. L R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 1. C. C. 729 (1933).
75. Alton R. R. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 215 I. C. C. 317 (1936).
76. Chaffee R. R. v. Western Md. Ry., 156 I.C.C. 53 (1925); Huntington &
B. T. M. R. R. & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 183 1. C. C. 685 (1932); Short
Lines' Divisions, 205 I. C. C. 61 (1934).
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of the joint rate or percentage advances on the existing divisions. 77
Despite the expansion of the Commission's jurisdiction over divisions of
joint rates, certain limitations have been imposed under the Act of 1920
which deserve mention. In the first place, the Commission has held that
it is powerless to prescribe divisions of a joint rate which covers a haul
participated in by United States and foreign carriers, refusing to consider
even the division among domestic carriers of that part of the joint rate charged
for services performed entirely within the United States. 78 Furthermore, the
Commission has jurisdiction under the Act only over the 'division of joint
rates as between common carriers engaged in interstate transportation by
railroad, water, or motor vehicle;79 it has no power over the division of
joint rates for the transportation of oil by pipe line carriers,80 nor over the
division of joint intrastate rates.81 But the primary restriction upon the
Commission's jurisdiction lies in the requirement that the rates to be divided
must be joint, as distinguished from combination rates.82 The fundamental
distinction is that a joint rate is a single rate for joint services established
by mutual agreement of the carriers or by the Commission, while a com-
bination rate is merely the sum of the rates charged by each carrier acting
independently. In order to establish a joint rate which the Commission can
apportion, the carriers must not only satisfy this definition, but must comply
with certain statutory requirements, such as filing concurrences with the
77. New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196 (1922); Pacific & I. N. Ry. v. Oregon
S. L. R. R., 185 I. C. C. 249 (1932).
78. New England Divisions, 126 I. C. C. 579 (1927). But prior to 1920 the Com-
mission had held that, though it had no power to require foreign lines to enter into
joint rates, when they voluntarily established joint rates with United States carriers,
they subjected themselves to the Commission's jurisdiction over the divisions of such
rates. Port Huron & Duluth S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 50 I. C. C. 157 (1918).
79. The provisions of §§ 15(3) and 15(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act apply
in terms only to carriers by water or railroad. 41 STAT. 485, 486 (1920), 49 U.S. C.
§ 15(3),(6) (1934). Nevertheless, the Commission asserted its jurisdiction under that
Act when a railroad received divisions for motor truck service which it had substituted
for rail service. See Trucking Less-Than-Carload Freight in lieu of Rail Service,
185 I. C. C. 71. 74 (1932). In 1935, the Motor Carrier Act. amending the Interstate
Commerce Act, conferred on the Commission jurisdiction over the division of joint
rates of motor vehicle carriers. The Commission's power in this new field exactly
parallels its jurisdiction over railroads and water carriers. 49 STAT. 558, 559 (1935),
49 U.S.C. §316(e)(f) (Supp. II, 1935). See also 49 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§316(a) (c) (Supp. II, 1935); MCCOLLESTER AND CLARK. op. cit. supra note 1, at
160-167.
80. The fact of a practical pipe line monopoly by the Standard Oil Co. [see 2
SHARFI.MAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 59, 971 might eliminate to a great extent the pos-
sibility of divisional controversies. There have been joint rates in effect, however,
between pipe line carriers, so that the possibility is not non-existent. Crude Petroleum
Oil from Kansas and Oklahoma, 59 I. C. C. 483 (1920); Brundred Bros. v. Prairie
P. L. Co., 68 I. C. C. 458 (1922).
81. Sugar Land Ry., 126 1. C. C. 529 (1927).
82. Kanawha Black Band Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 142 1. C. C. 433 (1928).
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Commission, and publishing their names in the joint tariff as participating
carriers.83 Thus, a railroad may pay the switching charges of a terminal
carrier and "absorb" or include them in its own rates, so that the one charge,
covering the services of two carriers, is, in effect, a joint rate to the shipping
public; yet the failure to show in the published tariff that the terminal road
is a participator deprives the Commission of jurisdiction to consider the
fairness of the switching allowance.8 4
But these jurisdictional limitations, operative in a comparatively small
number of cases, do not seriously impair the Cormnission's power to control
rate divisions in the public interest, and under the 1920 Act, that power has
remained a significant expedient for dealing with the strong-and-weak road
problem. Disregarding the principles of stare decisis,85 the Commission has
determined each case upon its merits, keeping in mind the relation of its
power over divisions to the rate policy of the Transportation Act. With
the repeal of the recapture provision of the Act in 1933,80 it seems clear that
the Commission's exercise of its authority over rate divisions is destined to
become increasingly important as an instrument to divert a portion of aggre-
gate earnings in the support of essential but financially distressed carriers,
especially in cases where the traffic will not support an increase in the joint
rate.
It was a controversy arising within this area of administrative regulation
that occasioned the recent Supreme Court decision in Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
v. United States. The proceeding was instituted by southern carriers who
petitioned the Commission to prescribe just and reasonable divisions of
joint citrus fruit rates between themselves and certain northern carriers.
Following a hearing in which the northern carriers made no claim of con-
fiscation, the Commission adjusted divisions in favor of the southern lines,8 T
83. New York Dock Ry. v. Baltimore & 0. R. RL, 73 I. C. C. 656 (1922) ; St. Louis
& O'Fallon Ry. v. East St. Louis & S. Ry., 81 I. C. C. 538 (1923).
84. Canton R. R. v. Ann A. R. R., 163 I. C. C. 263 (1930) ; cf. Keystone Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. Director General, 73 I. C. C. 273 (1922).
85. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 375 (1934).
86. Under the recapture clause, a carrier receiving a net operating income in excess
of 6% of the value of its railway property was required to pay one half of the excess
to the Commission to be used for loans to needy carriers or to purchase railroad equip-
ment for lease to carriers. 41 ST.T. 489 (1920). The provision was repealed by the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 220 (1933), 49 U.S. C.
15a(i), (2) (1934).
87. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 194 L C. C. 729 (1933). The
Commission held that the transportation costs of the southern carriers appeared higher
than those of the northern lines, taking into consideration the costly service of originat-
ing citrus fruit traffic from widely spread production points, expensive reconsignment
services, the necessity of using special refrigerator cars brought from the north, and
the consequent heavy per diem costs, switching services and empty car movements.
Higher rate levels and lower traffic density in the south than in the north, and the
fact that the population of the northern states vas three times that of the southern
states also indicated less favorable operating conditions in the south. Finally, the Corn-
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affirming its order without basic modification after a further hearing.88 The
northern lines subsequently petitioned for a second rehearing and presented
evidence which they alleged substantiated their claim, now made for the first
time, that the Commission's order gave them so small a share of the joint
rates as to be confiscatory. Upon refusal of the Commission to reopen the pro-
ceeding, the northern carriers sued in the federal district court to enjoin en-
forcement of the Commission's order. Over the Commission's objection, the
carriers were permitted to introduce additional evidence. The district court
held, however, that confiscation was not shown with sufficient certainty, and
dismissed the case.89 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the lower court's
decree was affirmed. 90 The majority of the Court, with Justices Brandeis,
Stone, Roberts and Cardozo concurring specially, held that the issue of
confiscation had been seasonably raised by the second petition for rehearing;
that while the Commission's findings of fact as to whether the prescribed
divisions fulfilled the statutory requirements of reasonableness and justness
were, if based on the evidence, conclusive upon review, the Commission
could not finally determine the constitutional question of whether prescribed
divisions constituted just compensation; that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment assures the carrier a full hearing before the court on this
question, including "the right to introduce additional evidence and have
judicial findings based upon it";91 but that the lower court's decision on
the merits was correct. The concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis agreed
that the suit was without merit but held that the charge of confiscation was
not seasonably made before the Commission,92 and that even if seasonably
raised, confiscation could never be an ultimate issue in a divisions case.
mission found that the southern carriers' financial position was worse than that of the
northern lines and that the citrus fruit traffic was of far greater importance to them.
88. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 375 (1934). A
further proceeding dealing with the retroactive adjustment of divisions previously re-
quired was also held. 210 I. C. C. 66 (1935).
89. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 181 (E. D. Va. 1934).
90. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797 (1936).
91. See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 807-808 (1936).
92. Justice Brandeis urged that since no abuse of discretion was involved in the
Commission's refusal to reopen the proceedings on evidence in no sense newly adduced
[cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932)], the claim of
confiscation had not been seasonably raised, on the analogy that an objection first
presented in a petition for rehearing which has been denied by a lower court is not
seasonably raised in a reviewing federal appellate court, unless in connection with the
denial, the objection was specifically passed on by the lower court. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 191 (1909); Weinstein v. Laughlin, 21 F. (2d) 740
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Winland, 182 Fed. 493
(C. C. A. 8th, 1910). The Supreme Court, however, had already stated that a party
was not barred from attacking an order on constitutional grounds because the claim
was not made before the Commission. See Manufacturers' Ry. v. United States, 246
U. S. 457, 489 (1918).
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Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the issue of confiscation was irrelevant
seems highly persuasive. In substance, he contended that in considering a
division of a joint rate between A and B, it would never be safe to increase
A's share merely on proof that it was confiscatory without evidence that B
was receiving better treatment; 3 for if the entire joint rate is non-com-
pensatory, B's share may be as confiscatory as A's. In that event, to increase
A's share would be unfair to B; for in a divisions case, the Commission has
no power to increase the entire joint rate, and any increase in A's share
would therefore have to be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in B's
share. The majority opinion purported to answer this argument by stating
that, because the carriers had not contended otherwise, the entire joint rate
would be assumed to be compensatory, and that it was therefore beyond the
Commission's power to allot any carrier a confiscatory division.
This statement implies that proof as to the nature of the entire joint rate
might have been introduced, in the first instance, in the divisions proceeding.
A strong argument can be made that in the interests of administrative
efficiency and orderly procedure, this question should first be determined in
a rate order proceeding where the joint rate could be increased if found
confiscatory; and that if the joint rate were there found to be compen-
satory, the carrier complaining of a confiscatory division could rely on that
determination in a subsequent divisions case without encumbering the latter
action by the introduction of proof as to the nature of the joint rate.
But even if it be conceded that such evidence might properly have been
introduced in the case under discussion, the Court's argument is open to
criticism because of its assumption in the absence of a contention to the con-
trary that the joint rate was compensatory. If it had clearly been shown that
the joint rate was compensatory, it would perhaps have been reasonable to
deny the Commission power to divide the joint rate in such a way as to make
one carrier's share confiscatory, for the carrier could presumably get no
relief in a rate order proceeding.94 On the other hand, if the entire joint rate
had been clearly shown to be confiscatory, the only solution would apparently
have been to approve the Commission's apportionment, unless arbitrary, and
leave the carriers to their remedy in a rate order proceeding, a solution which
the majority opinion seems to imply would be proper. The most difficult
problem is presented where, as in the case under consideration, there is no
evidence as to whether the joint rate is compensatory. In such a situation,
it would seem fair to refuse to consider the confiscation issue unless the com-
plaining carrier sustained the burden of proving that the entire joint rate
was compensatory; this would not only accord with the usual practice of
placing the burden of proof on the complainant, but would appear most likely
93. See Louisville & N. R. R. Coal & Coke Rates, SO I. C. C. 54, 57-58 (1918);
Alcolu R. R_ v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 163 1. C. C. 531, 534 (1930).
94. This of course assumes that a carrier is entitled to a compensatory return from
each rate as distinguished from total operations. But see infra. pp. 826427.
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to achieve the proper result, since it is probable that if one carrier's share
is confiscatory, the other carriers' shares, which have presumably been al-
lotted equitably according to a variety of factors, are also non-compensatory.
There would be little wisdom in upsetting an apportionment of this character
which is otherwise fair on the mere chance that the whole joint rate might
be compensatory.
The Baltimore & Ohio case presents a second issue of broader significance
relating to the entire problem of rate regulation: for implicit in the discussion
of the appropriateness of the confiscation issue by both the majority and
concurring opinions is the assumption that the constitutional protection of
the Fifth Amendment assures the carrier of a non-confiscatory return from
each rate. Upon this question, the decisions of the Supreme Court reveal
opposing authority. The earlier cases indicate that the carrier is not neces-
sarily entitled to earn a fair return upon every service, due process of law
requiring merely that the earnings of the entire line be compensatory 5 A
more numerous group of cases holds that the carrier may not be compelled
to perform a particular service without compensation even though the return
from its entire business is adequate.96 While this view now appears to have
prevailed, a rather tenuous distinction is sometimes drawn to the effect that
although a confiscatory rate may not be imposed, the carrier cannot refuse
to perform a particular service merely because it will not earn a compensatory
return, since the furnishing of adequate facilities to the public is an incident
of the carrier's fictional undertaking.9 7 The explanation of these apparently
inconsistent propositions may be that the courts will not allow a carrier to
refuse to perform an unprofitable service, because the possibility remains of
permitting it to charge a higher rate for the service, on a showing of con-
fiscation, 98 a privilege which will be small comfort to the carrier if it is al-
ready charging a rate that will produce optimum revenues.
The rule that the carrier is entitled to earn a fair return on every service
seems unfortunate in several respects. In the first place, the requirement
95. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 (1909) ; cf. Minneapolis & St. L.
R. R. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 267 (1902) ; see Cardozo, J., dissenting in Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. R. & Navigation Co., 288
U. S. 14, 50-51 (1933).
96. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Northern P. Ry. v. North Dakota,
236 U. S. 585 (1915); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. West Va., 236 U. S. 605 (1915);
Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U. S. 413 (1925). The carrier is not, however, entitled
to earn a fair return upon each branch of its system. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Gill,
156 U. S. 649 (1895); Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 244
U. S. 574 (1917).
97. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. North Carolina Corp. Comm., 206 U. S. 1 (1907);
Missouri P. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262 (1910) ; New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall,
245 U. S. 345 (1917). But see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Wash-
ington R. R. & Navigation Co., 288 U. S. 14, 40-43 (1933).
98. Cf. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 269 U. S. 244 (1925).
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assumes ability on the part of the courts to separate the cost of some particular
service from the total expenses of the road, involving general overheads and
the carrying of passengers and a thousand varying types of freight, usually
in mixed train or car-loads ;9 it likewise requires the ascertainment of that
proportion of the total property investment peculiarly attributable to the
service in question.100 Faced with such problems, it is obviously impossible
for the courts, except in the extraordinary ca.e, to detennine with any degree
of accuracy whether or not a particular rate is confiscatory. The confiscation
doctrine as applied to individual rates involves'the further assumption that
the rate structure of railroads can be adjusted in the light of the valuation
determined for the road. The extent to which this assumption is true is open
to question. 10' In the case of the monopolistic public utility operating in a
single municipality, rates can be adjusted to yield the required rate of return
on property value, however computed. But this is largely impossible in the
case of railroads where 85 per cent of the traffic is competitive.102 The rates
of competing carriers must obviously be on the same level. It is patently
useless for the courts to hold rates applicable over the lines of a weak carrier
confiscatory, where the carrier cannot .put a higher rate into effect without
diverting traffic to its more efficient competitors.10 3 Therefore, the concept is
of possible utility only in the minority of cases where competitive rates are
not in effect. And even in this situation, since a fair rate of return upon total
operations is undoubtedly guaranteed, the particular rate claimed to be con-
fiscatory could at best produce but a small part of the carrier's total revenue.
A safeguard of such minor importance does not appear essential enough to
overbalance the practical difficulties inherent in the attempt to allocate costs
to a particular service.
The most significant feature of the Baltintorc & Ohio case is the light it
casts upon the present attitude of the Supreme Court toward the scope of
99. Both the C.urt and the Commission have admitted the impossibility of ac-
curately ascertaining cost. See Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 25f, 260 (19G6) ;
Sugar from Key Vest, 112 I. C.C. 347. 34,9 (1926); Gergia Pub. Service Comm. v.
Atlantic C. L. R. R., 186 L C.C. 157, 187 (1932).
100. The difficulties of railroad valuation are almost insurmountable. See Beutel,
Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases (1930) 43 H,'n%.
L. REv. 1249. 1278-1280. The additional problem of determining the prop,0rtion 4.f total
value attributable to any particular service may be resolved only by the use of an
obviously arbitrary formula. See Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Arcade & A. R. R., 198
LC.C. 375, 377-378 (1934).
101. See 1 SHARF.MAN. THE I~nERSTATE CoNTisEvcE CoMMIssIo: (1931) 213, n. 75;
Moore, Railroad Rates and Revenues (1930) 16 V A. L Ra'. 243. 245-246: Beutel. supra
note 100, at 1275-1276.
102. See 'Moore, supra note 101, at 245.
103. In 'Minnesota Rate Cases. 230 U S. 352 (1913). the successful carrier was
unable to charge higher rates where the rates enjoined were enforceable against one
of its competitors. See Mloore. supra note 101, at 247.
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judicial review of administrative orders.104 The selection of a technique for
passing upon administrative orders involves two problems. First, the court
must decide whether an order will be reversed only if the administrative
body acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or whether it will be set aside if the
court itself would have decided the case differently. Second, the court must
choose between considering only the evidence presented to the administrative
body, and allowing a trial de novo in the judicial proceedings.' 05
The history of judicial review of the Interstate Commerce Commission's
orders reveals considerable wavering between these techniques. Under the
original Interstate Commerce Act, the courts adopted the approach which gave
them the broadest possible latitude. They invariably substituted their opinion
on the merits of the case for that of the Commission,'0 " treating the latter's
findings of fact only as prima facie evidence; 107 and the Act was construed as
requiring a trial de novo in the judicial proceedings, 08 an attitude which
effectively limited the usefulness of the Commission's activities.100 The only
significance of the investigation and determination by the Commission was
to shift the burden of proof in court; and because the courts reviewed on
the facts and accepted additional evidence, they often decided an entirely
different case than that considered by the Commission." 0
In 1906, the Hepburn Act was passed to overcome the evident defects of
the former legislation."' The substantive powers of the Commission were
greatly increased, and although the extent of judicial review was not spelled
104. For general discussions of judicial review of administrative orders, see DICK-
INSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW (1927); FREUND,
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928); McFARLAND, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM-
MIssioN (1933).
105. If the court decides that it will reverse an administrative order only where
the Commission acted unreasonably, it seems rather illogical to permit the introduction
of new evidence at the trial as a basis for judging the Commission's reasonableness.
But cf. Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. I. C. C., 164 Fed. 645 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1908). Contra:
Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States. 218 Fed. 89 (W. D. Va. 1914).
106. See Texas & P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 239
(1896) ; cf. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648 (1900) ; Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 186 U. S. 320 (1902).
107. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 stipulated that the report of the Com-
mission was to be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated. 24 STAT. 385
(1887).
108. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S.
184 (1896) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry., 168 U. S. 144 (1897).
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that it did not approve of withholding evidence
before the Commission and producing it for the first time at trial. See Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, jupra, at 196.
109. See ANN. REP., I.C.C. (1897) 27-37; BERNHARDT, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION (1923) 16.
110. See ANx. REP., I. C. C. (1891) 20-21; McFARLAND, supra note 104, at 106.
111. 34 STAT. 584 (1906).
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out, the "prhna facie evidence" rule was eliminated. In passing on adminis-
trative orders under this Act, at least in cases involving statutory rather than
constitutional questions, the courts have exhibited some tendency to adopt
a self-limiting attitude. In the first place, they have shown an inclination to
examine only the reasonableness of the Commission's orders. The early cases
laid down rather ambiguous rules to the general effect that reviewing courts
should not usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside an order
because of their conceptions of its wisdom and expediency." - Certain matters
were classified as "administrative questions,"11 3 peculiarly within the province
of the administrative body, upon which the courts refused, to substitute their
judgment for that of the Commission.1 14 The trend apparently was to con-
sider the Commission a fact-finding body somewhat similar in function to a
jury, 15 so that the principal inquiry of the courts was directed to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence upon which the administrative findings of fact were
based. 1 6 In the cases dealing with the propriety of a trial de novo, the at-
112. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. L IL, 215 U. S. 452, 470
(1910); Interstate Commerce Commission v. P. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547 (1912);
Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 297-298 (1912).
113. Findings of the commission as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
a rate or divisions are conclusive upon the courts if supported by the evidence. I. C. C.
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 218 U. S. 88 (1910); I.C.C. v. Louisville & N. R. L,
227 U. S. 88 (1913); New England Divisions, 261 U. S. 184 (1923); Western Paper
Makers' Chemical Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926); Chicago, R. L &
P. Ry. v. United States, 274 U. S. 29 (1927); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v.
United States, 292 U. S. 282 (1934). And as to whether rates or practices result in
discrimination or preferences, I. C. C. v. Delaware, L. & V. R. FL, 220 U. S. 235
(1911); United States v. Louisville & N. R. R., 235 U. S. 314 (1914); Virginian Ry.
v. United States,. 272 U. S. 658 (19-6); Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States
283 U. S. 501 (1931); Georgia Pub. Service Comm. v. United States, 283 U. S. 765
(1931); Illinois Commerce Comm. v. United States, 292 U. S. 474 (1934). Rules of
car distribution, [I. C. C. v. Illinois C. R. R., 215 U. S. 452 (1910); Assigned Car
Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927)] or accounting (Norfolk & NV. Ry. v. U. S., 287 U. S.
134 (1932); Atlanta, B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 296 U. S. 33 (1935)] are final.
See 2 SHARMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 387-393, 423 et seq. But in reparation cases,
the Commission's orders are enforceable only through court action and are only prima
facie evidence of "the facts therein stated." 36 STAT. 554 (1910), 49 U.S.C. 16(2)
(1934).
The doctrine of "negative orders" and the Commission's primary jurisdiction was
also developed by the courts as a further expression of self-limitation. See 2 SHAu.F-
mAx, supra, at 393-417; Miller, The Necessity for Preliminary Resort to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1932) 1 GEo. ,VAsn. L. Ray. 49.
114. See HEaDasoN, THE FEDERAL TRADE Corsmssro- (1924) 97-98; Tollefson,
Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1927) 11
MIrN. L. Rav. 504, 510 et seq.
115. See DicKImsoN, op. cit. supra note 104, at 158-159, 167-170, 312.
116. See McFAw.ArN, op. cit. supra note 104, at 121. The Commission was reversed
for acting without evidence. Florida E. C. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 167 (1914) ;
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924). It was also reversed for error of law.
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titude of judicial self-denial was not so uniform, two lower courts dividing
sharply on this issue.117 But the Supreme Court expressly approved a trial
court's action in restricting review to the evidence before the Commission.'1
Here, however, as in other areas of administrative activity, it had been
indicated that a different attitude would prevail in respect to the review of
constitutional issues. Before the Baltimore & Ohio case, the question was
perhaps not entirely foreclosed as to whether the courts should consider
anything more than the reasonableness of the Commission's action. There
were few cases in which the Commission's orders were challenged upon
grounds of unconstitutionality as distinguished from the statutory grounds
of unfairness or unreasonableness, and in those cases, the constitutional claim
involved practices rather than rates. The Supreme Court dealt with these
cases simply by denying that any basis for the constitutional objection existed
and then proceeding to settle the controversy by applying the usual standards
of review, reiterating its refusal to reverse findings of fact supported by the
evidence.1 9 But while there were no direct expressions by the Court as to
how'far, in a proper case, it would accept the Commission's determinations of
subsidiary questions of fact bearing upon the issue of constitutionality, there
were dicta in which the Court intimated that in such cases the Commission
would be held to a stricter accountability. 20 In the Manufacturers Railway
case, the Court stated that so long as the Commission proceeds in accordance
with the requirements of the Commerce Act, its administrative orders, if
made after due hearing and supported by the evidence, are not subject to
attack in the courts. But it also recognized that "matters of constitutional
right are not to be conclusively determined by the Commission.'' In several
cases, however, the Commission's findings of fact were held conclusive even
though they seemingly determined constitutional rights, properly urged to
the Court.1 22 It can at least be said that there were no precedents requiring
the Court to ignore the Commission's determination, and scrutinize the evi-
dence for itself on questions of "constitutional fact."
United States v. Penn. R. R., 242 U. S. 208 (1916) ; Central R. R. of N. J. v. United
States. 257 U. S. 247 (1921) ; Peoria & P. U. Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 528 (1924);
Ann A. R. R. v. United States, 281 U. S. 658 (1930).
117. An early case held that review should be by trial de novo. Missouri, K. &
T. R. R. v. I. C. C., 164 Fed. 645 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1908). Contra: Louisville &
N. R. R. v. United States, 218 Fed. 89 (,V. D. Va. 1914).
118. Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States, 245 U. S. 463 (1918).
119. Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 351 (1915); United States v.
American Ry. Express Co., 265 U. S. 425 (1924); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. United
States, 270 U. S. 287 (1926).
120. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States, 238 U. S. 1, 16 (1915).
121. 246 U. S. 457, 488, 489 (1918).
122. Los Angeles Switching Case, 234 U. S. 294 (1914); 1. C. C. v. Southern P.
Ry., 234 U. S. 315 (1914); see Brown, The Function of Courts and Commissions in
Public Utility Rate Regulation (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 141, 165.
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In regard to the evidence which the Court should consider in reviewing
the Commission's order, the Baltimore & Ohio decision had been more
clearly foreshadowed, for the Supreme Court had held in the Manufacturers
Ry. case that where a constitutional claim was made, judicial review might
be had by trial de novo.lm The Court stated, however, that it would be more
appropriate practice to introduce all pertinent evidence before the Com-
mission, and that where the Commission had set aside a given rate, a clear
case was required to justify the court, on evidence not newly discovered,
in annulling the Commission's order as confiscatory.12 4
The decision in the Baltimore & Ohio case, definitely declaring that facts
decisive in the adjudication of constitutional rights must be investigated in-
dependently by the courts, and reaffirming the view that in such cases a trial
de novo is proper, is a development perhaps consistent with the body of doc-
trine recently clarified in related fields; a2 but, however orthodox this view
may be as a matter of doctrine, it makes for an all-inclusive judicial super-
vision of administrative processes strikingly inconsistent with considerations
of practicality and efficiency long urged to support a policy of limiting the
scope of judicial review.
It has been pointed out that the theory sometimes adopted in justifying
full judicial review-namely, that the action of the administrative body was
a legislative act open to judicial examination to the same extent as other
such acts' 2 -- is by its own terms inapplicable in the case of an administrative
body which performs quasi-judicial functions.' It has been reiterated that
in dealing with highly complex questions such as valuation'28 and cost
123. 246 U. S. 457 (1918).
124. Id. at 489.
125. Cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936).
126. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 289 (1920);
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 725-726 (1936).
127. See Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions
of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. op PA. L REv. 1055, 1060-1061; Brown, supra
note 122, at 150-152; Note (1936) 50 HARv. L REv. 78, 83. The Court stated in the
Baltimore & Ohio case that the "prescribing of divisions is a legislative function."
See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 802 (1936). But
Justice Brandeis' view that it is a quasi-judicial function [id. at 8171 seems more
realistic. See Curtis, Judicial Reziew of Commission (1921) 34 HAv. L. REv. 862;
Hardman, Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation (1921)
30 YA t L. J. 681; cf. Hardman, The Extent of the Finality of Commissions' Rate Reg-
ulations (1922) 28 V. VA. I Q. 111.
128. When the courts are dealing with a small utility, the task of determining value
is almost impossible. Beutel, Due Process in Valuation of Local Utilities (1929) 13
MINN. L. REv. 409, 423 et seq. See factors listed by Justice Brandeis as entering into
the ascertainment of value. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Service Comm.,
262 U. S. 276, 293-295 (1923). But the problem attains metaphysical proportions in
the case of a railroad. See Beutel, supra note 100, at 1278 et seq.
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allocation, it is impractical to ask over-burdened courts 1 20 to substitute
their judgment for that of an administrative body which is much better
equipped to handle the problem,'8 ° to the detriment of the administrative
body's prestige and future effectiveness. And the evils of the trial de 1,ovo
have often been emphasized: not only does it involve delay, wasted time and
expense, and a duplication of efforts, but an obvious opportunity is afforded
for "holding off" pertinent evidence before the administrative body and pre-
senting it for the first time in court.' 3' Nor is the force of these objections
greatly lessened by an attempt to limit review of statutory, as distinguished
from constitutional questions, since a skillful pleader may often be able to
obliterate the distinction."32 These considerations are all particularly per-
tinent in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Indeed, they
have been recognized by the Court in respect to questions of statutory inter-
pretation arising before that body, and no reason appears why they are not
equally apposite in connection with questions of fact subsidiary to the de-
termination of constitutional issues5."' The Supreme Court's refusal to
acknowledge their cogency in the Baltimore & Ohio case is further evidence
of its purpose not to limit the judicial control of administrative activity which
it has already established in the name of constitutional right.
129. See Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal
Supreme Court (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 127, 143; Dickinson, supra note 127, at 1062;
cf. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 290-292.
130. See Mr. Justice Hughes, Some Aspects of the Development of Anerican Law
(1916) 39 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 266, 269; Hardman, supra note 127, at 689;
Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 81. The Supreme Court has accorded finality to
administrative findings of value in tax proceedings [Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894)], and in condemnation proceedings [Long Island Water
Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897)] even though the constitutional claim
was made. Cf. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
131. DICKINSON, supra note 127, at 1061-1062; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
1037.
132. See DIcKINSON, supra note 127, at 1072, 1077-1078.
133. See Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies (1921)
27 W. VA. L. Q. 207, 210-211.
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